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Abstract - An emotional version of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests that differences in language 
emotionalities influence differences among cultures no less than conceptual differences. 
Conceptual contents of languages and cultures to significant extent are determined by words and 
their semantic differences; these could be borrowed among languages and exchanged among 
cultures. Emotional differences, as suggested in the paper, are related to grammar and mostly 
cannot be borrowed. Conceptual and emotional mechanisms of languages are considered here 
along with their functions in the mind and cultural evolution. In language evolution from 
primordial undifferentiated animal cries conceptual contents increase, emotional reduced. This 
leads to a fundamental contradiction in human mind. Reduced emotionality of vocalization is 
necessary for language evolution. But “too low” emotionality makes language “irrelevant to 
life,” disconnected from sensory-motor experience. Neural mechanisms of these processes are 
suggested as well as their mathematical models: the knowledge instinct, the language instinct, 
the dual model connecting language and cognition, dynamic logic, neural modeling fields. 
Mathematical results are related to cognitive science, linguistics, and psychology. Experimental 
evidence and theoretical arguments are discussed. Approximate equations for evolution of 
human minds and cultures are obtained. The knowledge instinct operating in the mind hierarchy 
leads to mechanisms of differentiation and synthesis determining ontological development and 
cultural evolution. The mathematical model identifies three types of cultures: "conceptual" 
pragmatic cultures, in which emotionality of language is reduced and differentiation overtakes 
synthesis resulting in fast evolution at the price of uncertainty of values, self doubts, and internal 
crises; “traditional-emotional” cultures where differentiation lags behind synthesis, resulting in 
cultural stability at the price of stagnation; and “multi-cultural” societies combining fast cultural 
evolution and stability. Unsolved problems and future theoretical and experimental directions are 
discussed. 
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1. Emotional Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 
  
Benjamin Whorf (Whorf, 1956) and Edward Sapir (Sapir, 1985) in a series of publications in 
the 1930s researched an idea that the way people think is influenced by the language they speak. 
Although there was a long predating linguistic and philosophical tradition, which emphasized 
influence of language on cognition (Bhartrihari, IVCE/1971; Humboldt, 1836/1967; Nietzsche, 
1876/1983), this is often referenced as Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (SWH). Linguistic evidence in 
support of this hypothesis concentrated on conceptual contents of languages. For example, words 
for colors influence color perception (Roberson, Davidoff, & Braisbyb, 1999; Winawer, 
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Witthoft, Frank, Wu, Wade, & Boroditsky, 2007). The idea of language influencing cognition 
and culture has been criticized and “fell out of favor” in the 1960s (Wikipedia, 2009a) due to a 
prevalent influence of Chomsky‟s ideas emphasizing language and cognition to be separate 
abilities of the mind (Chomsky, 1965). Recently SWH again attracted academic attention, 
including experimental confirmations (see the previous references) and theoretical skepticism 
(Pinker, 2007). Interactions between language and cognition have been confirmed in fMRI 
experiments (Simmons, Stephan, Carla, Xiaoping, & Barsalou, 2008). Brain imaging 
experiments by Franklin, Drivonikou, Bevis, Davie, Kay, & Regier (2008) demonstrated that 
learning a word “rewires” cognitive circuits in the brain, learning a color name moves perception 
from right to left hemisphere. These recent data address in particular an old line of critique of 
SWH: whether the relationships between cultures and languages are causal or correlational; and 
if causal, what is the cause and what is the effect. Franklin et al (2008) experiments have 
demonstrated that language affects thinking, not the other way around. This discussion will be 
continued later but first I would like to emphasize that all arguments and experiments referenced 
above concentrated on conceptual effects of language.  
Emotional effects might be no less important (Guttfreund, 1990; Harris, Ayçiçegi, & 
Gleason, 2003). In particular indicative are results of (Guttfreund, 1990): whereas the mother 
tongue is usually perceived as more emotional, Spanish-English bilinguals reported more intense 
emotions in psychological interviews conducted in Spanish than in English, irrespective of 
whether their first language was English or Spanish. Still, experimental evidence of interaction 
between the emotional contents of languages and cognition is limited, the neural mechanisms of 
these interactions are not known, and no computational models have existed (Perlovsky, 
2006a,b,c; 2009a,b; 2010d,f,g,m).  
This paper derives neurally motivated computational models of how conceptual and 
emotional contents of language affect cognition. The next section reviews conceptual and 
emotional mechanisms of language and its interaction with cognition. I briefly review existing 
theoretical ideas and experimental evidence on language evolution, conceptualizing possible 
mechanisms, and emphasizing directions for future research. Section 3 summarizes previously 
developed neuro-mathematical theories of interaction between language and cognition 
(Perlovsky, 2004; 2006a,b,c; 2009a,b; 2010d,f,g,m), which have been partially proven 
experimentally. These models are extended toward hierarchy of the mind. Section 4 derives 
neurally motivated cultural evolutionary models and demonstrates that different cultural 
evolutionary paths are favored by differences in interaction between cognition and language. In 
conclusion I discuss future theoretical and experimental directions. 
 
 
2. Language and cognition 
  
Language is widely considered as a mechanism for communicating conceptual information. 
Emotional contents of language are less appreciated and their role in the mind and evolutionary 
significance are less known. Still their roles in ontology, evolution, and cultural differences are 
significant. Whereas much research concentrates on language-computation, sensory-motor, and 
concept-intention interfaces (Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002), this paper emphasizes that the 
primordial origin of language was a unified neural mechanism of fused voicing-behavior, 
emotion-motivation, and concept-understanding (Deacon, 1989; Lieberman, 2000; Mithen, 
2007). It is likely that differentiation of mechanisms involved in language, voicing, cognition, 
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motivation, and behavior occurred at different prehistoric times, in different lineages of our 
ancestors. This may be relevant to discussions of evolution of language and cognition (Botha, 
2003; Botha & Knight 2009). 
I address the current differentiated state of these abilities in the human mind, as well as 
unifying mechanisms of interfaces-links, which make possible integrated human functioning. 
The paper concentrates on mechanisms of existing interfaces and their cultural evolution. Before 
describing in the next section mechanisms of language, concepts, and emotions mathematically I 
will summarize these mechanisms conceptually in correspondence with general knowledge 
documented in a large number of publications emphasizing certain aspects that have escaped 
close scientific attention in the previous research. 
 
2.1 Primordial undifferentiated synthesis 
 
Animals‟ vocal tract muscles are controlled mostly from the ancient emotional center 
(Lieberman, 2000). Vocalizations are more affective than conceptual. Mithen (Mithen, 2007) 
summarized the state of knowledge about vocalization by apes and monkeys. Calls could be 
deliberate, however their emotional-behavioral meanings are probably not differentiated; 
primates cannot use vocalization separately from emotional-behavioral situations; this is one 
reason they cannot have language.  
Emotionality of voice in primates and other animals is governed from a single ancient 
emotional center in the limbic system (Deacon, 1989; Lieberman, 2000; Mithen, 2007). 
Cognition is less differentiated than in humans. Sounds of animal cries engage the entire psyche, 
rather than concepts and emotions separately. An ape or bird seeing danger does not think about 
what to say to its fellows. A cry of danger is inseparably fused with recognition of a dangerous 
situation, and with a command to oneself and to the entire flock: “Fly!” An evaluation (emotion 
of fear), understanding (concept of danger), and behavior (cry and wing sweep) – are not 
differentiated. Conscious and unconscious are not separated. Recognizing danger, crying, and 
flying away is a fused concept-emotion-behavioral synthetic form of cognition-action. Birds and 
apes can not control their larynx muscles voluntarily. 
 
2.2 Language and differentiation of emotion, voicing, cognition, and behavior 
 
Origin of language required freeing vocalization from uncontrolled emotional influences. 
Initial undifferentiated unity of emotional, conceptual, and behavioral-(including voicing) 
mechanisms had to separate-differentiate into partially independent systems. Voicing separated 
from emotional control due to a separate emotional center in cortex which controls larynx 
muscles, and which is partially under volitional control (Deacon, 1989; Mithen, 2007). Evolution 
of this volitional emotional mechanism possibly paralleled evolution of language computational 
mechanisms. In contemporary languages the conceptual and emotional mechanisms are 
significantly differentiated, compared to animal vocalizations. The languages evolved toward 
conceptual contents, while their emotional contents were reduced. Cognition, or understanding of 
the world, is due to mechanisms of concepts, also referred to as mental representations or 
models. Barsalou calls this mechanism situated simulation (Barsalou, 2009). Perception or 
cognition consists of matching mental concept-models (simulations) with patterns in sensor data. 
Concept-models generate top-down neural signals that are matched to bottom-up signals coming 
from lower levels (Grossberg, 1988; Perlovsky, 2001) In this simulation process the vague 
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mental models are modified to match concrete objects or situations (Perlovsky, 1987; 2001; 
2006a; Bar, Kassam, Ghuman, Boshyan, Schmid, Dale, Hämäläinen, Marinkovic, Schacter, 
Rosen, and Halgren, 2006). 
How these cognitive processes are determined and affected by language? Primate‟s cognitive 
abilities are independent from language. Language is fundamental to human cognitive abilities 
(Perlovsky, 2006a). A possible mathematical mechanism of language guiding and enhancing 
cognition have been discussed in (Perlovsky, 2004; 2006a,c; 2007a,b; 2009a,b; 2010d,g,m; 
Fontanari & Perlovsky, 2005; 2007; 2008a,b; Fontanari, Tikhanoff, Cangelosi, Perlovsky, & Ilin, 
2009). This is a mechanism of the dual model whereby every concept-model has two parts: 
cognitive and language. The language models (words, phrases) are acquired from surrounding 
language by age of five or seven. They contain cultural wisdom accumulated through millennia. 
During the rest of life the language models guide the acquisition of cognitive models. 
 
2.3 Emotions, instincts, and the knowledge instinct 
 
The word emotion refers to several neural mechanisms in the brain (Juslin & Västfjäll, 
2008); in this paper I always refer to instinctual-emotional mechanism described in (Grossberg & 
Levine, 1987). The word instinct in this paper is used in correspondence with this reference to 
denote a simple inborn, non-adaptive mechanism of internal “sensor,” which measures vital body 
parameters, such as blood pressure, and indicates to the brain when these parameters are out of 
safe range. This simplified description will be sufficient for our purposes, more details could be 
found in (Grossberg & Seidman 2006; Gnadt & Grossberg, 2008) and references therein. We 
have dozens of such sensors, measuring sugar level in blood, body temperature, pressure at 
various parts, etc. 
Mechanisms of concepts evolved for instinct satisfaction. According to instinctual-emotional 
theory (Grossberg & Levine, 1987), communicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction of instinctual 
needs from instinctual “sensors” to decision making parts of the brain is performed by emotional 
neural signals. Perception and understanding of concept-models corresponding to objects or 
situations that potentially can satisfy an instinctual need receive preferential attention and 
processing resources in the mind. In this paper emotions refer to neural signals connecting 
conceptual and instinctual brain regions.  
Perception and cognition requires matching top-down signals from concept-models to 
bottom-up signals coming from sensory organs. Perception is required for survival. Therefore 
humans and high animals have an inborn drive to fit top-down and bottom-up signals, the 
knowledge instinct (KI; Perlovsky & McManus, 1991; Perlovsky, 1997; 2000; 2006a; 2007a). 
These references discuss specific emotions related to satisfaction or dissatisfaction of KI. These 
emotions are related purely to knowledge, not to bodily needs; since Kant (1790) this type of 
emotions are called aesthetic emotions. According to the theory of KI they are inseparable from 
every act of perception and cognition. 
Biologists and psychologists have discussed various aspects of this mechanism: a need for 
positive stimulations, curiosity, a motive to reduce cognitive dissonance, a need for cognition 
(Harlow & Mears, 1979; Berlyne, 1960; Festinger, 1957; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 
1996; Levine & Perlovsky, 2008). Until recently, however, this drive was not mentioned among 
„basic instincts‟ on a par with instincts for food and procreation. The fundamental nature of this 
mechanism became clear during mathematical modeling of workings of the mind. Our 
knowledge always has to be modified to fit the current situations. We don‟t usually see exactly 
5 
the same objects as in the past: angles, illumination, and surrounding contexts are different. 
Therefore, our mental representations have to be modified; adaptation-learning is required 
(Grossberg, 1988; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001).  
All learning and adaptive algorithms maximize correspondence between the algorithm 
internal structure (knowledge in a wide sense) and objects of recognition; the psychological 
interpretation of this mechanism is KI. The mind-brain mechanisms of KI are discussed in 
(Levine & Perlovsky, 2008). As discussed below, it is a foundation of higher cognitive abilities, 
and it defines the evolution of consciousness and cultures. 
 
2.4 Grammar, language emotionality, and meanings 
 
Language and voice started separating from ancient emotional centers possibly millions of 
years ago. Nevertheless, emotions are present in language. Most of these emotions originate in 
cortex and are controllable aesthetic emotions. Their role in satisfying KI is considered in the 
next section. Emotional centers in cortex are neurally connected to old emotional limbic centers, 
so both influences are present. Emotionality of languages is carried in language sounds, what 
linguists call prosody or melody of speech. This ability of human voice to affect us emotionally 
is most pronounced in songs. Songs and music, however, is a separate topic (Perlovsky, 2006d; 
2008; 2010a) not addressed in this paper. 
Emotionality of everyday speech is low, unless affectivity is specifically intended. We may 
not notice emotionality of everyday “non-affective” speech. Nevertheless, “the right level” of 
emotionality is crucial for developing cognitive parts of models. If language parts of models 
were highly emotional, any discourse would immediately resort to fights and there would be no 
room for language development (as among primates). If language parts of models were non-
emotional at all, there would be no motivational force to engage into conversations, to develop 
high cognitive models driven by language. Higher cognition would not be developed. Lower 
cognitive models, say for object perception would be developed because they are imperative for 
survival and because they can be developed independently from language, based on direct 
sensory perceptions, like in animals. But models of situations and higher cognition are developed 
based on language models (Perlovsky, 2004; 2006a,c; 2007b; 2009a; 2010f,g,m). As discussed 
later, this requires emotional connections between cognitive and language models.  
Primordial fused language-cognition-emotional models, as discussed, have differentiated 
long ago. The involuntary connections between voice-emotion-cognition have dissolved with 
emergence of language. They have been replaced with habitual connections. Sounds of all 
languages have changed and, it seems, sound-emotion-meaning connections in languages should 
have severed. If the sounds of a language change slowly the connections between sounds and 
meanings persists and consequently the emotion-meaning connections persist. This persistence is 
a foundation of meanings because meanings imply motivations. If the sounds of a language 
change too fast, the cognitive models are severed from motivations, and meanings disappear. If 
the sounds change too slowly the meanings are nailed emotionally to the old ways, and culture 
stagnates. 
This statement is a controversial issue, and indeed, it may sound puzzling. Doesn‟t culture 
direct language changes or is the language the driving force of cultural evolution? Direct 
experimental evidence is limited; it will have to be addressed by future research. Theoretical 
considerations suggest no neural or mathematical mechanism for culture directing evolution of 
language through generations; just the opposite, most of cultural contents are transmitted through 
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language. Cognitive models contain cultural meanings separate from language (Perlovsky, 
2009), but transmission of cognitive models from generation to generation is mostly facilitated 
by language. Cultural habits and visual arts can preserve and transfer meanings, but they contain 
a minor part of cultural wisdom and meanings comparative to those transmitted through the 
language. Language models are major containers of cultural knowledge shared among individual 
minds and collective culture. 
The arguments in the previous two paragraphs suggest that an important step toward 
understanding cultural evolution is to identify mechanisms determining changes of the language 
sounds. As discussed below, changes in the language sounds are controlled by grammar. In 
inflectional languages, affixes, endings, and other inflectional devices are fused with sounds of 
word roots. Pronunciation-sounds of affixes are controlled by few rules, which persist over 
thousands of words. These few rules are manifest in every phrase. Therefore every child learns to 
pronounce them correctly. Positions of vocal tract and mouth muscles for pronunciation of 
affixes (etc.) are fixed throughout population and are conserved throughout generations. 
Correspondingly, pronunciation of whole words cannot vary too much, and language sound 
changes slowly. Inflections therefore play a role of “tail that wags the dog” as they anchor 
language sounds and preserve meanings. This, I think is what Humboldt (1836/1967) meant by 
“firmness” of inflectional languages. When inflections disappear, this anchor is no more and 
nothing prevents the sounds of language to become fluid and change with every generation.  
This has happened with English language after transition from Middle English to Modern 
English (Lerer, 2007), most of inflections have disappeared and sound of the language started 
changing within each generation with this process continuing today. English evolved into a 
powerful tool of cognition unencumbered by excessive emotionality. English language spread 
democracy, science, and technology around the world. This has been made possible by 
conceptual differentiation empowered by language, which overtook emotional synthesis. But the 
loss of synthesis has also lead to ambiguity of meanings and values. Current English language 
cultures face internal crises, uncertainty about meanings and purposes. Many people cannot cope 
with diversity of life. Future research in psycholinguistics, anthropology, history, historical and 
comparative linguistics, and cultural studies will examine interactions between languages and 
cultures. Initial experimental evidence suggests emotional differences among languages 
consistent with our hypothesis (Guttfreund, 1990; Harris, Ayçiçegi, & Gleason, 2003).  
Neural mechanisms of grammar, language sound, related emotions-motivations, and 
meanings hold a key to connecting neural mechanisms in the individual brains to evolution of 
cultures. Studying them experimentally is a challenge for future research. It is not even so much 
a challenge, because experimental methodologies are at hand; they just should be applied to 
these issues. The following sections develop mathematical models based on existing evidence 
that can guide this future research.  
 
 
3. Hierarchy of the mind and cultural dynamics 
  
This section summarizes mathematical models of the mind mechanisms corresponding to the 
discussion in the previous section. These models are based on the available experimental 
evidence and theoretical development by many authors summarized in (Perlovsky, 1987; 1994; 
1997; 1998; 2000; 2006a,b,c; 2007b; 1009a,b; 1010d,f,g,m; Perlovsky, Plum, Franchi, 
Tichovolsky, Choi, & Weijers, 1997) and it corresponds to recent neuro-imaging data (Bar et al, 
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2006; Franklin et al, 2008). 
Mechanisms of concepts, instincts, and emotions were described in above references and 
summarized in section 2.3. To briefly summarize, concepts operate like mental models of objects 
and situations; e.g., during visual perception of an object, a concept-model of the object stored in 
memory projects an image (top-down signals) onto the visual cortex, which is matched there to 
an image projected from retina (bottom-up signal). Perception occurs when top-down and 
bottom-up signals match. Concepts evolved for instinct satisfaction. The word instinct denotes 
here a simple inborn, non-adaptive mechanism of internal “sensor,” which measures vital body 
parameters, such as blood pressure. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction of instinctual needs is 
communicated from instinctual parts of the brain to decision making parts of the brain by 
emotional neural signals. Perception and understanding of concept-models corresponding to 
objects or situations that potentially can satisfy an instinctual need receive preferential attention 
and processing resources. Mathematical description of these mechanisms were summarized in 
(Perlovsky, 2006a; 2007a). 
Matching of top-down and bottom-up signals is described by dynamic logic; its fundamental 
aspect is the process “from vague to crisp.” Mental representations are stored in memory as 
vague and distributed; they do not remind images of objects or situations. In the process of 
matching top-down and bottom-up signals, these vague representations are matched to sensory 
images and become crisp. This however is only possible at lower levels of concrete object 
perception. Object perception, in other words, is grounded in sensor data. At higher cognitive 
levels there is no concrete sensor data to ground cognition of abstract concepts. Higher level 
cognition is only possible due to language. Mental language representations are acquired from 
surrounding language, where they exist “ready-made.” Learning of language does not require 
understanding of real life. For this reason language can be acquired early in life. This is why 
children learn language by 5 years of age, but cannot act like adults. The part of language instinct 
related to language learning is specific to humans; Pinker called it “the language instinct” (1994). 
The language instinct, however, does not connect language learning to real life. Cognitive 
representations connected to sensor and motor data are developed from life experience; the 
development of the hierarchy of these representations, far removed from direct sensor data, is 
only possible due to guidance by language. Cognitive representations connect language to life. 
This process (as any other mental process) could only move due to emotional motivations. 
Therefore, emotionality of language is crucial for connecting language to life (Perlovsky, 2006a; 
2007a; 2009a,b; 2010d,f,g,m). 
Let us emphasize this fundamental contradiction of the human mind mechanisms. Human 
cognition requires language. Evolution of language is only possible due to reduced emotionality 
of vocalization. Reduced emotionality constitutes the very possibility of language evolution and 
enables human cognition. However, if emotionality of a language becomes “too low,” it is not 
connected to real life, and becomes void of meaning. Human thinking exists in this contradiction: 
abstract concepts that do not steer emotions are weakly connected to life experience.  
 
 
4. Differentiation and synthesis 
  
The fundamental contradiction of human mind described above affects the hierarchical 
dynamics of KI manifested as differentiation and synthesis. In interaction of top-down and 
bottom-up signals, at every layer of the hierarchy KI drives more crisp and detailed development 
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of lower representations. At the same time KI drives higher representations toward more general 
and abstract ideas. Development of concrete and specific concepts is called differentiation, and 
creation of general concept-models, unifying differentiated signals is called synthesis.  
Differentiation and synthesis are in complex relationships, at once symbiotic and antagonistic 
(Perlovsky, 2007a; 2009b). Synthesis creates emotional value of knowledge, it unifies language 
and cognition, and in this way it creates conditions for differentiation; it leads to spiritual 
inspiration, to active creative behavior leading to fast differentiation, creativity, knowledge, to 
science and technology. At the same time, a “too high” level of synthesis, “too” high emotional 
values of concepts stifles differentiation, as in traditional consciousness: every notion is so 
valuable emotionally that its differentiation becomes impossible. 
Synthesis leads to growth of general concept-models and to growth of the hierarchy. This is 
counterbalanced by differentiation. Differentiation leads to the growth of the number of concepts 
approaching “precise knowledge about nothing”. In the knowledge-acquiring regime the growth 
of synthesis is limited psychologically since the emotions of  KI satisfaction “spread” over large 
number of concepts cannot sustain growing number of concepts , D. This is well known in many 
engineering problems, when too many models are used. Thus, whereas emotional synthesis 
creates a condition for differentiation (high emotional value of knowledge, efficient dual model 
connecting language and cognition, conceptual differentiation undermines synthesis (emotional 
value of knowledge). This interaction can be modeled by the following equations (Perlovsky 
2009b): 
 
dD/dt = aD G(S), G(S) = (S - S0) exp(-(S-S0)/ S1),  
dS/dt = -b D + d H,  
H(t) = H0 + e*t. (1) 
  
Here, t is time, D is a number of concepts (differentiation), S models synthesis, emotional 
satisfaction of KI, H is a number of hierarchical levels; a, b, d, e, S0 and S1 are constants. 
Differentiation, D, grows proportionally to already existing number of concepts, as long as this 
growth is supported by synthesis, while synthesis is maintained at a “moderate” level, S0 < S < 
S1. “Too high” level of synthesis, S > S1, stifles differentiation by creating too high emotional 
value of concepts. Synthesis, S, is related to emotion, but the detailed relationship will have to be 
established in future research. Synthesis, S, grows in the hierarchy, along with a number of 
hierarchical levels, H. By creating emotional values of knowledge, it sustains differentiation, 
however, differentiation, by spreading emotions among a large number of concepts destroys 
synthesis. Detailed model of hierarchical dynamics H is difficult, so instead we just consider a 
period of slow growth of the hierarchy H. At moderate values of synthesis, solving eqs.(1) yields 
a solution in Fig. 1a. The number of concepts grows until certain level, when it results in 
reduction of synthesis; then the number of models falls. As a number of models falls, synthesis 
grows, and the growth in models resumes. The process continues with slowly growing, 
oscillating number of models. Oscillations affecting up to 80% of knowledge indicate internal 
instability of knowledge-accumulating consciousness. Significant effort was extended to find 
solutions with reduced oscillations, however, no stable knowledge-acquiring solution was found 
based on eqs.(1). This discussion is continued below (Fig.2). 
Another solution corresponds to initially high level of synthesis, Fig. 1b. Synthesis continues 
growing whereas differentiation levels off. This leads to a more and more stable society with 
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high synthesis, in which high emotional values are attached to every concept, however, 
differentiation stagnates. 
 
 Fig.1a. Conceptual-differentiating culture  Fig.1b. Emotional-traditional culture 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Evolution of culture at moderate values of synthesis oscillates: periods of flourishing and knowledge 
accumulation alternate with collapse and loss of knowledge (a = 10, b = 1, d = 10, e = 0.1, S0=2, S1=10, and initial 
values D(t=0) = 10, S(t=0) = 3, H0 = 1; parameter and time units are arbitrary). In long time the number of models 
slowly accumulates; this corresponds to slowly growing hierarchy. (b) Evolution of highly stable, stagnating society 
with growing synthesis. High emotional values are attached to every concept, while knowledge accumulation stops 
(M(t=0)= 3, H0 = 10, S(t=0) = 50, S0 = 1, S1 = 10, a = 10, b = 1, d = 10, e=1). 
 
These two solutions of eqs.(1) can be compared to Humboldt‟s (1836/1967) characterization 
of languages and cultures. He contrasted inert objectified “outer form” of words vs. subjective, 
culturally conditioned, and creative “inner form.” Humboldt‟s suggestion continues to stir 
linguists‟ interest today, yet seem mysterious and not understood scientifically. 
This paper analysis suggests the following interpretation of Humboldt‟s thoughts in terms of 
neural mechanisms. His “inner form” corresponds to the integrated, moderately emotional neural 
dual model (Perlovsky, 2004; 2006c; 2007b; 2009a,b; 2010g). Contents of cognitive models are 
being developed guided by language models, which accumulate cultural wisdom, Fig. 1a. “Outer 
form” of language corresponds to inefficient state of neural dual model, in which language 
models do not guide differentiation of the cognitive ones. This might be due to either too strong 
or too weak involvement of emotions. If emotional involvement in cognition or language is too 
weak, learning does not take place because motivation disappears. If emotional involvement is 
too strong, learning does not take place because old knowledge is perceived as too valuable, and 
no change is possible. The first case might be characteristic of low-inflected languages, when 
sound of language changes “too fast,” and emotional links between sound and meanings are 
severed. The second case might be characteristic of “too strongly” inflected languages, in which 
sound changes “too slowly” and emotions are connected to meanings “too strongly;” this could 
be a case of Fig. 1b. A brief look at cultures and languages certainly points to many examples of 
this case: highly inflected languages and correspondingly “traditional” stagnating cultures. 
Which of these correspond to Fig. 1b and the implied neural mechanisms? What it means 
quantitatively: “too fast” or “too slow,” and which cultures and languages correspond to which 
case will require further psycholinguistic and anthropological research.  
Preliminary analysis indicates English as a typical language corresponding to Fig. 1a. and 
Arabic corresponding to Fig. 1b. This corresponds to Humboldtian analysis. The integrated dual 
 
S 
H 
D 
D 
S 
H 
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model assumes “moderate” emotional connection between language and cognitive models, 
which fosters the integration and does not impede it. Humboldt suggested that this relationship is 
characteristic of inflectional languages (such as Indo-European), inflection provided “the true 
inner firmness for the word with regard to the intellect and the ear” (today we would say 
“concepts and emotions”). The integrated dual model assumes a moderate value of synthesis, 
Fig. 1a, leading to interaction between language and cognition and to accumulation of 
knowledge. This accumulation, however, does not proceed smoothly; it leads to instabilities and 
oscillations, possibly to cultural calamities; this characterizes significant part of European history 
from the fall of Roman Empire to recent times. 
Much of contemporary world is “too flat” for an assumption of a single language and culture, 
existing without outside influences. Fig. 2 demonstrates an evolutionary scenario for two 
interacting cultures that exchange differentiation and synthesis; for this case eqs. (1) are modified
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Effects of cultural exchange (k=1, solid lines: M(t=0)= 30, H0 = 12, S(t=0) = 2, S0 = 1, S1 = 10, a = 2, b 
= 1, d = 10, e=1, x = 0.5, y = 0.5; k=2, dotted lines: M(t=0)= 3, H0 = 10, S(t=0) = 50, S0 = 1, S1 = 10, a = 2, b 
= 1, d = 10, e=1, x = 0.5, y = 0.5). Transfer of differentiated knowledge to less-differentiated culture dominates 
exchange during t < 2 (dashed blue curve). In long run (t > 5), cultures stabilize each other, and swings of 
differentiation and synthesis subside while knowledge accumulation continues. 
by adding xD to the first equation and yS to the second, where x and y are small constants, while 
D and S are taken from the other culture. The first and second cultures initially corresponded to 
Figs.1a and 1b correspondingly. After the first period when the influence of the first culture 
dominated, both cultures stabilized each other, both benefited from fast growth and reduced 
instabilities. 
 
 
5. Discussion and future research 
 
Connections between the neural mechanisms, language, emotions, and cultural evolution 
proposed in this paper are but a first step requiring much experimental evidence and theoretical 
development. Influence of language on culture, the Bhartrihari-Humboldt-Nietzsche-Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis formalized by the discussed mechanism adds a novel aspect to this old idea. 
M1 
M2 
S1 
S2 
H1 
H2 
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The emotional contents of languages could be more important in influence on cultures than their 
conceptual contents.  
In the milieu defined by Chomsky‟s assumed independence of language and cognition the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (SWH) has steered much controversy: 
 
“This idea challenges the possibility of perfectly representing the world with language, because it 
implies that the mechanisms of any language condition the thoughts of its speaker community” 
(Wikipedia, 2008). 
 
The fact that Wikipedia seriously considers a naïve view of “perfectly representing the 
world” as a scientific possibility is indicative of a problematic state of affairs, “the prevalent 
commitment to uniformitarianism, the idea that earlier stages of languages were just as complex 
as modern languages” (Hurford, 2008). With the development of cognitive and evolutionary 
linguistics diversity of languages are considered in their evolutionary reality, and identifying 
neural mechanisms of language evolution and language-cognition interaction is coming in 
demand.  
Neural mechanisms proposed in this paper and models inspired by these mechanisms are but 
an initial step in this line of research. Nevertheless concrete predictions are made for relations 
between language grammars and types of cultures. These predictions can be verified in 
psycholinguistic laboratories, eq.(1) coefficients can be measured using existing methods. 
Future mathematical-theoretical research should address continuing development of both 
mean-field and multi-agent simulations, connecting neural and cultural mechanisms of emotions 
and cognition and their evolution mediated by language.  KI theory should be developed toward 
theoretical understanding of its differentiated forms explaining multiplicity of aesthetic emotions 
in language prosody and music (Perlovsky, 2006d; 2008; 2010a). This theoretical development 
should go along with experimental research clarifying neural mechanisms of  KI (Levine & 
Perlovsky, 2008; Bar et al, 2006) and the dual language-cognitive model, (Perlovsky, 2009). 
Recent experimental results on neural interaction between language and cognition (Franklin 
et al, 2008; Simmons et al, 2008) support the mechanism of the dual model. Brain imaging can 
be used to directly verify the dual model. These methods should be expanded to interaction of 
language with emotional-motivational, voicing, behavioral, and cognitive systems 
Prehistoric anthropology should evaluate the proposed hypothesis that the primordial system 
of fused conceptual cognition, emotional evaluation, voicing, motivation, and behavior 
differentiated at different prehistoric time periods. Are there data to support this hypothesis, can 
various stages of prehistoric cultures be associated with various neural differentiation stages? 
Can different humanoid lineages be associated with different stages of neural system 
differentiation? What stage of neural differentiation corresponds to Mithen‟s hypothesis about 
singing Neanderthals (Mithen, 2007)? Psychological social and anthropologic research should go 
in parallel documenting various cultural evolutionary paths and correlations between cognitive 
and emotional contents of historical and contemporary cultures and languages. 
Proposed correlation between grammar and emotionality of languages can be verified in 
direct experimental measurements using skin conductance and fMRI neuro-imaging. Emotional 
version of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis should be evaluated in parallel psychological and 
anthropological research. More research is needed to document cultures stagnating due to “too” 
emotional languages; as well as crises of lost values due to “low” emotionality of languages. 
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